He Loves Me, He Loves Me Not: A response to the two wills of God

I recently blogged about the difficulty Calvinists have in being able to say that God truly loves everyone. You can read my comments about that topic here: Does God Love Everyone?. The gist of that argument was this.

1. If God loves everyone, then he would want the best for them.
2. The best for them is being in a relationship with God.
3. On the Calvinist view, God must cause someone to be in relationship with him.
4. Not all are in relationship with God.
5. Therefore, on the Calvinist view, God does not love all.

In the post, I tried to overcome objections that may be raised, specifically the one about God showing different kinds of love to different people.

A short time later, a facebook friend raised another objection that I had not considered – the two wills of God. The objection basically says this: God has more than one will. He has a precretive or moral will and he has a decretive or sovereign will. What was argued was that God truly loves people, but he has an overarching will that glorifies him more, a will that causes him not to express love to some and justly send them to hell for their sins. Here are some excerpts of the objection.

The Objection

“[God] may love one thing (like a person), and yet love a second thing MORE (like his glory) such that it forces him to choose to NOT show love toward the first thing. When you insert a competing love, that may make God NOT love someone that he would have otherwise loved, had that competing desire not been introduced. God’s emotions are complex and can result in God both feeling love for someone and yet choosing to act in such a way that His love for them is suspended, being constrained by a competing desire. In this way, He can both love AND hate the reprobate. God may very well desire that you repent, come to Him, be saved, enjoy everlasting life, etc, AND desire that you NOT do any of those things at the exact same time, with the latter desire winning out (not to the complete elimination of Him continuing to feel the former). I may love chocolate, but I may love not getting fat MORE and decide to not eat the chocolate. In one sense I want it, and in another sense I don’t. My love for chocolate hasn’t gone away, it’s just been constrained by a greater, competing desire. It’s like that with God…He can both desire one’s everlasting good, benefit, wellbeing, flourishing, relationship with Him, etc. AND desire to not act on that (for some) because of a greater love – namely, the love he has for manifesting His own glory. Perhaps the saving of some and the destruction of others brings Him more glory than would the salvation of all, and therefore the destruction of some would come to pass in spite of His love for them due to His greater governing desire to glorify Himself.”

Although I am still wrestling with this topic, here are my initial thoughts regarding this objection.

Response

My understanding of the two wills of God has been similar to what is described above. He has a moral or perceptive will and a decretive or sovereign will. His moral will is the laws and precepts that he desires/wills based up his good and perfect moral character. He decretive will is the will that ultimately gets carried out (what comes to pass in reality). This will brings about the greatest good and glory for God. A perfect example is the death of Jesus. Sinful acts carried out by men and abhorred by God were in God’s very plan to bring about salvation. The moral will was placed subject to (at least temporarily) the decretive will to bring about the greatest good.  But I see two problems with this “two wills” approach as we try to apply it to this specific problem of God’s love for all.

First, in the examples used to show the tension between these two wills, it is always evil or suffering that is permitted. The carrying out of his moral will is what is always suspended – people are allowed to act contrary to what God commands for a time. But trying to apply this to the “does God love everyone” question seems to imply that God is able to act contrary to his moral will by personally not doing something his moral will would require. But this CERTAINLY is not the case, for he always acts consistent with his character. For if God is loving, he can’t not be loving. If God is just, he can’t not be just, etc. At least on the surface, this seems to pit God against himself.

Second, when we look at the two wills of God, the moral will is always subject to the decretive will ONLY for a temporary time. God allows evil and suffering, but only temporarily. So it’s not as though God chooses to always allow evil so that he receives greater glory – for never dealing with evil would be against his character. But rather, God allows evil only for a temporary period before he deals with it decisively. His justice is only suspended a short time. It is not eternally playing second fiddle to his glory. But if we apply this two wills approach to his love for all, then it seems like he is eternally suspending what is good and essential to his character, namely his love, to manifest his glory to a greater degree. For a temporary time we can understand and make sense of this (e.g. when suffering strikes for a time that brings us closer to God), but eternally suspending his love? Eternally loving yet not ever showing love? How can this be?

Finally, I want to respond to something said in the quote above. It was stated: “He may love one thing (like a person), and yet love a second thing MORE (like his glory) such that it forces him to choose to NOT show love toward the first thing. When you insert a competing love, that may make God NOT love someone that he would have otherwise loved, had that competing desire not been introduced.” As the old cliché saying goes, love is a verb. I think this is true. Love is an action as illustrated by 1 Cor. 13:4-7. So to say that God can love someone void of any action seems contradictory to the Biblical understanding of love (unless one means it in the “common grace” sense that I pointed out in the previous post). In this same quote, it is said that the competing desire may make God NOT love someone that he would have otherwise loved. I think this confirms my point. On the Calvinist view, God seems to choose to NOT love some, and withholding love, in my mind, seems to be the same thing as not loving.

I have not explored this topic in great detail, so there may be stones yet unturned. But as it stands, its seems a Calvinist will find it impossible to affirm – in a meaningful sense – that God loves everyone. As a person sympathetic with much of reformed doctrine, this troubles me and has left me with more questions than answers. But I do know this: God is good and his truth will satisfy. Therefore, I encourage you to wrestle with me on these matters in an effort to know the truth. I look forward to your comments.

Jordan